This paper provides a time-series analysis of recent annual estimates of real GDP and industrial output covering 1270 to 1913. We show that growth can be regarded as a segmented trend stationary process. On this basis, we find that trend growth of real GDP per person was zero prior to the 1660s but then experienced two significant accelerations, pre-and post-industrial revolution. We also find that the hallmark of the industrial revolution is a substantial increase in the trend rate of growth of industrial output rather than being an episode of difference stationary growth. JEL Classification: N13; O47
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Introduction
The recent publication of the results of an ambitious project to provide estimates of long-run English economic growth (Broadberry et al., 2015) marks a major step forward in the analysis of pre-industrial economic performance. The book provides annual estimates of real GDP, population, and of real output in the agricultural, industrial and services sectors from 1270 to 1870 for England pre-1700 and Britain post-1700. On the basis of these numbers, the authors put forward a new analysis of British economic growth.
Our principal objective in this paper is to examine the validity of the description and analysis of economic growth provided by Broadberry et al. (2015) , in particular by evaluating the statistical properties of the time series on which they are based. The discussion provided by the authors is informal and based on arithmetic rather than econometrics. We believe that time-series analysis can be helpful in several ways. Most obviously, it is valuable to consider explicitly the confidence intervals around estimated trends and to test formally for structural breaks. In addition, it is important to consider the nature of trend growth in a pre-industrial economy and whether it differs from that experienced under modern economic growth: for example, was a trend-stationary phase superseded by a difference-stationary era? 1 Timeseries analysis of the new estimates also provides an opportunity to revisit the work of Mills and Crafts (1996a) on trends in industrial output growth during the industrial revolution to see how far it is now in need of revision.
For our purposes in this paper, we take the growth estimates provided by Broadberry et al. (2015) as reliable and we do not attempt any critique of or revisions to them. Of course, they may well be challenged or revised in future and already we know that the results of this project, based on building up estimates from the output side, contrast with those obtained by Clark (2010) , which were derived from the income side. For example, Clark's estimates show incomes at the time of the Industrial Revolution to be no higher than 400 years earlier and thus seem consistent with a 'Malthusian economy'. Nevertheless, we think it useful to explore the implications of the Broadberry et al. estimates as they stand.
Our main findings are as follows. First, when Hodrick-Prescott (1997) trends are fitted to real GDP per person, we find that, on average, trend growth was 0.2% per year over the 500 years from 1270 to 1770. Nevertheless, growth performance before the Industrial Revolution differed between sub-periods, with trend growth approximately zero on average between 1 A trend-stationary process is one for which all shocks to the series being analysed have only transitory effects and, in its simplest form, may be modelled as a linear time trend having random fluctuations about this trend, so that the series always reverts back to the trend line. For a difference-stationary process, in contrast, all shocks are permanent, so that in its simplest form the series evolves as a (possibly drifting) random walk, and thus becomes the accumulation of all past shocks, which must then remain permanently in the series. For more detailed discussion of the distinction from an economic history perspective see, for example, Mills (1996 Fourth, we are able to clarify the idea that there was an absence of 'growth reversals'. An analysis of the impact of the Black Death, which reduced population by nearly 50 per cent,
shows that it can be seen as a levels shock which left the trend rate of growth unchanged.
The trend rate of growth of real GDP per person is estimated as 0.03 per cent per year both pre-1350 and post-1400, but in the latter period output per person was sustained at a level about 40 per cent greater, quite unlike the predictions of a naive Malthusian model. We also reject the hypothesis of a unit root in favour of trend-stationarity in each of the segments of the trend that we identify, implying that following a shock the economy would fairly quickly revert to its trend path. From the second half of the 17 th century trend growth of real GDP per person was significantly above zero, which suggests that the Malthusian era was over.
Fifth, trend growth in both GDP and industrial production follow an inverted U-shape if Overall, we think that these results are generally supportive of the interpretation of growth performance proposed by Broadberry et al. (2015) .
Literature Review
The (Kuznets, 1966) , characterized by a further acceleration in the trend rate of growth of real GDP per person combined with significant population growth and underpinned by technological progress (pp. 212, 408-409) .
are trend breaks in the Broadberry estimates suggests positive shifts in 1582 and 1853 (Greasley et al., 2013) . 4 Voigtländer and Voth (2013) propose that a high level of income in the Malthusian equilibrium is the platform from which subsequent take-off was launched. If the Black Death resulted in a positive levels-effect shock to real GDP per person which was sustained for a lengthy period of time, this would account for a high-level equilibrium. The consolidation of a higher income level after the Black Death saw a long period when population failed to recover -it took until the early 17 th century to return to the level of the 1340s and a high level of mortality has been suggested as a key factor (Smith, 2012 Greasley and Oxley (1994, p. 762) argued that to identify the industrial revolution as a distinct macroeconomic epoch requires that output innovations were permanent (difference stationary) during the discontinuity but transient (trend stationary) at other times. They claimed that this criterion was met for industrial output for the years 1780-1851 during the period 1700 to 1913. Crafts and Mills (1994) rejected this argument for two reasons. First, they thought that the key criterion for the industrial revolution is in terms of a substantial rise in the trend rate of growth of output rather than the statistical properties of the time series and, second, they suggested that the appropriate alternative hypothesis was not linear but quadratic trend stationarity and rejected the unit root on this basis. In the absence then of a suitable time series neither of these papers was, however, able to analyze real GDP or to adopt a longer-run perspective including pre-1700 observations.
Trend Growth Rates: an Initial Overview
The underlying model for obtaining trend growth rates is that of an additive decomposition of the series t x , the logarithm of the variable under consideration and which is observed over the years
, into a trend, t  , and a cycle, t  , typically assumed to be independent of each other, i.e.,
Various models may be assumed for the trend component. For example, t  may be defined as a deterministic segmented trend, typically linear in t but Mills and Crafts (1996a) have used a cubic polynomial; it may be defined as a stochastic 'structural' trend in which t  follows a random walk with, perhaps, a random walk drift (see Crafts, Leybourne and Mills, 1989, and Crafts, 1996b) ; or t  may be estimated using a filter, as in Crafts and Mills (2004) . Mills (2009 Mills ( , 2016 provides detailed historical and technical development of these various approaches.
We employ in this section the last approach, and consequently fit Hodrick-Prescott (H-P, 1997) trends to GDP, GDP per person, industrial production and industrial production per person. H-P trends are chosen for a preliminary analysis because they are known to be robust to the shifting regimes that must naturally occur over a very long sample period of over 600 years, and are readily comparable across the alternative series. This comparison is facilitated by using the same smoothing parameter, set at 10000   , for each series, a setting that produces satisfactorily smooth, albeit evolving, trend components and readily interpretable trend growth rates, defined as
, which gives the growth rate in percentages per annum.
The use of a higher value for  than is often employed in much macroeconomic modelling (for example, setting the smoothing parameter to 100 is common practice when using annual data) may be justified from the theoretical and simulation analyses of Harvey and Trimbur (2008) and Flaig (2015) .
The data that we use for this analysis are taken from the estimates reported as continuous series in index number format for 1270 to 1870 by Broadberry et al. (2015, Appendix 5. 3).
These estimates are for England only prior to 1700 and then for Great Britain. We have extended these series to 1913 using the well-known estimates for the United Kingdom by Feinstein (1972, pp. T18, T111 and T120) . We also show one-standard error lower bounds for the trend growth rates in Figures 3 and 4 , computed using the method outlined in Giles (2011) . The lower bounds may be interpreted
as providing approximately 16% level significance tests: one-standard error bounds are used here because of the extreme variability of the actual annual growth rates compared to trend growth rates, with the variance of actual growth rates being between 35 and 250 times the variance of trend growth rates. This leads to standard errors in the region of 0.8% apart from at the two ends of the sample period, where the standard errors increase rapidly because of end-point effects ( Figures 3 and 4 are consequently truncated to the years 1300 to 1900).
Unfortunately, this means that discussion of comparative growth performance over time using this technique is somewhat compromised since differences in trend growth are never statistically significant at conventional levels.
Periods in which the one-standard error lower bound of trend growth exceeds zero are shown as shaded intervals in Figures 3 and 4: for example, GDP per person trend growth is 'significantly' above zero on this criterion between 1347 and 1352, between 1662 and 1688, and from 1830 onwards. Even so, this implies that if a lower bound estimate is computed on a 2-standard error basis this will always be below zero, even after the industrial revolution. This seems to suggest that a forecaster could not rule out a 'growth reversal' even in the era of 'modern economic growth'. We believe that this would be an inappropriate conclusion to draw, as subsequent sections of the paper suggest.
Segmented linear trend models of GDP per person and industrial production per person
An alternative approach to estimating trend growth rates is to fit a segmented trend model which entails periodic breaks in trend. We report estimates which suggest that this procedure has some statistical justification, at least when compared with the alternative of a difference stationary model, and generally provides support for the view that the growth process was trend stationary. Viewing the long-run growth performance of the British economy through this lens allows a number of interesting inferences to be drawn, in particular because the standard errors associated with the estimated trends are much smaller, since the trend path is assumed to be deterministic, than those resulting from the Hodrick-Prescott methodology.
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The results of this complementary approach to constructing trend growth rates for GDP per person are shown in Figure 5 , where a segmented linear trend is fitted with breaks for the arrival and departure of the Black Death, at 1348 and 1352, and further breaks at 1663, 1707 and 1822. Although there is a developing literature on automatically selecting multiple break dates using computational algorithms and structural break tests (see Perron, 2006 , for a comprehensive survey), they nevertheless remain in a relatively early stage of development and their properties in dynamic regression models have not been completely established, an important proviso here given that autocorrelation is found to be an integral feature of the segmented trend models reported below. 5 Consequently, the break dates listed above have been chosen visually (i.e., exogenously), taking the description of growth outcomes given by Broadberry et al. (2015, p. 155-6, 158, 198, 211-2, 213 ) as a starting point. 6 However, alternative break points in the vicinity of those chosen were also investigated to assess the robustness of this selection, which was found to be best in terms of overall goodness of fit.
We would, in any case, emphasise that such models should be regarded primarily as descriptive devices rather than as formal structural models of the growth process.
Nevertheless, the changes in trend growth in the late 17 th and early 19 th centuries can be linked to changes in the real economy, as has long been recognised in the historiography.
The former probably represents an acceleration of Smithian growth associated with 'the commercial revolution' (Davis, 1967) reflected in expanding international trade and closely linked with urbanization, including the advance of London to become Europe's largest city by 1700 (Wrigley, 1987) . The latter is the outcome of the technological changes of the industrial revolution whose impact on per capita growth only came through strongly by the second quarter of the 19 th century (Crafts and Harley, 1992) .
The general linear segmented model with m break dates can be written
where 5 Clearly, standard structural break tests of the Chow variety are not appropriate here as multiple breaks are being considered within which there is both autocorrelation and heterogeneity of variance. 6 These are as follows. First, there is a description of negative growth of industrial production from the Black Death to the closing decades of the 15 th century (pp. 155-6). Second, a phase of sustained growth of industrial production before a marked acceleration after 1780 is identified (pp. 158-9). Third, there is a description of similar trends in real GDP growth (p. 198). Fourth, there is statement that positive trend growth in real GDP per person began between the end of the Civil War and the Glorious Revolution and then moderated in the early 18 th century before accelerating to over 1 per cent per year by the 1830s (pp. 211-2). Fifth, it is noted that a big increase in the level of real GDP per head resulted from the Black Death and that this was subsequently maintained until trend growth began in the late 17 th century (p.213).
Thus trend growth in the i-th segment is given by
, from the estimate of which a standard error may readily be calculated using the formula for a variance of a linear combination of random variables. The form of (2) Interestingly, the test statistic for the complete post-1663 period is just -1.11 with a marginal probability value of 0.92, demonstrating that ignoring the shifts at 1707 and 1822 leads to the erroneous conclusion that the process generating GDP per person is difference stationary so that all shocks are permanent: a segmented trend model asserts, on the contrary, that shocks are typically transitory except at a small number of break points, where the trend shifts permanently.
The picture that emerges from this analysis provides a number of interesting results. First, it is seen in Figure 5 that both before and after the Black Death trend growth was constant at 7 The standard error accompanying the estimate is shown in parentheses.
9 0.03% per annum. An implication is that the Black Death produced a permanent upward shift of 36% in the level of GDP per person. This is mirrored in the estimates reported by Broadberry et al., (2015, A similar model was fitted to industrial production per person. 
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Segmented trend models of GDP and industrial production Segmented trend models for actual GDP and industrial production were also fitted. For GDP the fitted model was Industrial production is found to be difference stationary before 1446, in contrast to GDP.
The final segment was again broken at 1851 and, unlike GDP, industrial production was found to be difference stationary for the sub-period 1782 to 1851.
The constant trend growth rates for GDP and industrial production estimated from the final segment from 1782 are clearly at odds with the 'inverted U-shaped' trend growth found for this period using an H-P filter shown in Figures 3 and 4 . Consequently, cubic segmented trend models of the type considered by Mills and Crafts (1996a) for an earlier industrial production series were also fitted. For GDP this model took the form (5) and (6), with both the additional variables required to model a cubic trend highly significant.
Interestingly, a unit root test for industrial production with a cubic trend incorporated yields a test statistic of -5.90 for the period 1782-1913, considerably smaller, and hence more in favour of (cubic) trend stationarity, than those reported in Table 1(d) for this period. Figures 9 and 10 show trend growth from models (7) and (8) respectively along with H-P trend growth and the similarities between the two in the post-1782 period can now be clearly seen. For GDP, segmented trend growth reaches a maximum of 2.27% (1.93-2.61) in 1857 compared with 2.41% (0.81-4.01) for maximum H-P trend growth in 1851, while for industrial production segmented trend growth reaches a maximum of 2.99% (2.43-3.55) in 1842 compared with 3.22% (1.38-5.06) in 1834 for maximum H-P trend growth.
The outcome of this exercise is that the industrial revolution stands out as a transitory period when trend growth in industrial output was very high compared with both before and after. It seems to us that this is the distinctive feature of the early 19 th century rather than the notion that industrial production was a difference-stationary process uniquely in the period from 1782 to 1851.
Conclusions
Our results have implications not only for the quantification of claims made by Broadberry et al. (2015) but also for the wider historiography reviewed in section 2. From the perspective of a segmented trend stationary view of the world and on the basis of the output estimates made by Broadberry et al. (2015) , we have found the following.
First, from the Black Death through the English Civil War, trend growth of real GDP per person was approximately zero, but from then until the industrial revolution trend growth was positive at a modest rate; the industrial revolution itself saw a significant further increase after the Napoleonic Wars to a rate consistent with modern economic growth. This two-stage acceleration matches the predictions of a unified growth model as in Galor (2011) and the account of Broadberry et al. (2015) , but the timing of the breaks in trend is quite different from that suggested by Greasley et al. (2013) .
Second, these estimates imply that the English economy was surprisingly resilient between the Black Death and the industrial revolution. The Black Death itself emerges as a big positive levels shock to real GDP per person which moved the pre-industrial economy to a 'high-level equilibrium' in the sense of Voigtländer and Voth (2013) . From the second half of the 17 th century we not only see positive trend growth in real GDP per person but this is based on a trend stationary process which implies that following a shock the economy would revert to its trend path. This configuration underpins the emphasis placed by Broadberry et al. (2015) on the absence of 'growth reversals' and reinforces their interpretation of the Great Divergence.
Third, we can clarify the nature of the 'industrial revolution'. It entailed an economically and statistically significant increase in trend growth of real GDP per person and industrial output per person but this was accompanied by an even more impressive increase in trend growth of industrial output. We do not, however, agree with the suggestion made by Greasley and 13 Oxley (1994) that the industrial revolution should be characterized as a distinct macroeconomic epoch during which the growth of output was a difference stationary process.
Trend growth in both GDP and industrial production exhibits an inverted-U shape during the 19 th century which appears to be best described as a cubic segmented trend. This finding is of great interest since it relates to the British experience of the first industrial revolution.
Since this was the beginning of 'modern economic growth' it is important to understand what it entailed as clearly as possible. This point is given added weight by the advent of unified growth theory for which the escape from the Malthusian era is a focal point. Cubic segmented and H-P trend growth rates for GDP.
Figure 10
Cubic segmented and H-P trend growth rates for industrial production.
